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Consumer News
Federal Government
Moves To Combat
Doctors' Self-Dealing
As the nation begins to focus on
health care, new attention is being
paid to the volume of tests and
treatments which physicians prescribe. Many critics of our health
care system contend that too many
tests are performed and that in
some cases, excessive treatment is
prescribed.
Physicians prescribe so many
tests and treatments for a number
of reasons. Physicians have an incentive to order extra tests to defend themselves against future
malpractice claims. In addition, as
medical technology advances more
tests and treatments are available.
Finally, due to our aging population, the demand for medical services of all kinds has grown.
As more doctors invest in laboratories and treatment centers,
they may have an extra incentive
to prescribe special tests and treatments for their patients. Many
doctors argue that their investment
activity generates the capital needed for expensive and sophisticated
testing equipment, such as magnetic resonance imaging machines.
Critics, however, suggest that there
is a clear conflict of interest for
doctors who own the testing facilities to which they refer their patients.
The U.S. Inspector General conducted a study covering eight states
which found that "on average, physicians involved in joint ventures
order more tests or services for
their medicare patients," and that
those patients are "charged more
for such services." Last year, the
Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board ("Board") commissioned a survey of 2,200 clinics
statewide to study the impact of
physician ownership in medical
testing ventures.
The Florida study revealed that
45 percent of the physicians licensed in that state had invested in
medical joint ventures to which
they could refer their patients for
60

testing or treatment. The study
also indicated that doctor-owned
joint ventures "perform more tests
per patient, have higher charges
and provide a lower quality of
services" than other laboratories.
Following the Board's report,
the Florida legislature passed the
Patient Self-Referral Act ("SelfReferral Act"). Under the Self-Referral Act, doctors who have invested in medical joint ventures
have until October, 1995 to cease
making referrals to facilities in
which they continue to have a
financial interest.
On a national level, the Federal
Department of Health and Human
Services adopted new rules designed to discourage doctors who
are paid through Medicare and
Medicaid from investing in the
facilities to which they commonly
refer their patients. In addition,
Congress enacted new legislation,
effective January 1, 1992, barring
doctors who have a financial interest in a clinical laboratory from
referring their medicare patients
for tests to be performed by the
laboratory.
The federal legislation, however,
only addresses self-dealing with
respect to clinical laboratory tests.
Some groups have suggested that
the scope of this new law should be
expanded to cover referrals for
physical therapy and radiation
treatment as well. The Florida report indicates that physicians also
own treatment centers to which
they refer their patients for such
treatments as physical therapy or
radiation.

Impact of Solomon
Scandal on Consumers
The recent treasury auction
scandal, in which Solomon Brothers ("Solomon") played a leading
role, illustrates how unethical conduct in financial markets may impact consumers. The scandal turns
on allegations that Solomon manipulated the prices of United
States treasury securities sold at
monthly auctions. Activity at the

monthly treasury auctions sets the
interest rate the government will
have to pay on treasury securities,
affecting consumers in at least two
ways.
First, the interest rate on treasury securities influences other interest rates throughout the economy. Because treasury securities
are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States Government, they are considered the safest securities available.
The interest rate on treasury
securities provides the floor for all
other interest rates throughout the
economy, from home mortgage
rates to the prime rate paid by
corporate borrowers. For example,
as the prevailing interest rate on
treasury notes goes up, the prevailing home mortgage rate is likely to
go up.
Furthermore, the interest rate
on treasury securities impacts the
government's ability to reduce the
deficit. The United States government finances its deficit by selling
treasury securities at periodic auctions. Generally, when the interest
rate on securities goes up, the price
goes down. The government realizes less cash to apply toward the
deficit and incurs more interest
liability, making the deficit larger.
Solomon allegedly manipulated
prices at monthly auctions for treasury securities held by the United
States government. These auctions
are sometimes known as the primary market because the government only sells directly to 40 primary dealers, who in turn sell to
the public in what is known as the
secondary market. Solomon Brothers is one of the 40 primary dealers.
The primary dealers, through the
bidding process at treasury auc"Consumer News" is prepared by the
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tions, determine the discounted
price of a bond and the interest rate
paid by the government.
Solomon has already admitted
that it influenced prices of securities at treasury auctions. No single
primary dealer is permitted to buy
more than 35 percent of the total
amount of securities offered at an
auction. Solomon bought far more
than 35 percent by first buying in
its own name, and then buying in
the names of customers who had
not ordered the securities and were
not aware of the purchases.
Solomon also revealed that at an
auction last May, it controlled as
much as 94 percent of the notes
offered for sale. As a buyer, Solomon would, if it could, want to
purchase at the lowest price possible. By controlling large percentages of securities offered at auctions, Solomon could drive the
price down, thereby driving the
interest rate up.
If a primary dealer is able to push
the price of a treasury note down
and the interest rate up, all other
interest rates throughout the economy will most likely go up. Furthermore, a single primary dealer in
control of the market, could make
the federal deficit larger.
In response to the recent scandal, Representative Edward J.
Markey (D-Massachusetts) charges
that "[a] few individuals at the top
of the American financial pyramid
have been playing games with the
taxpayers' money." Markey has
been pushing for new stricter regulations on the markets for treasury
securities.
To the extent that Solomon was
able to occasionally buy more than
90 percent of an issue, the firm
could also possibly influence the
secondary market, impacting consumers as investors. Primary dealers, who buy at the monthly auctions, in turn sell those securities to
mutual funds and pension funds in
what is known as the secondary
market.
Treasury securities are popular
among institutional investors because they are risk-free. In the
secondary market, Solomon, as a
seller, would want to sell at the
highest price possible, diminishing
yields for institutional investors.
However, many analysts think
the recent scandal had virtually no
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effect on the secondary market.
Although Solomon could conceivably control the price of those
issues for which it dominated the
primary market, the secondary
market is extremely large and also
includes investors buying and selling to each other.
According to David Bowers,
head of the banking and finance
department at Case Western Reserve University, "Solomon's
transgressions didn't strike at the
foundation of the market." Analysts, like Bowers, point out that
because of the burgeoning federal
deficit, the entire secondary market is approximately $3.5 trillion
in outstanding debt, while an average auction of 2-year notes is approximately $12 billion.
Nevertheless, the recent scandal
has sparked a flurry of new regulatory activity. In January, the Treasury Department, which oversees
the auctions, announced its proposal for changes in the auction
process. The proposal reflects the
recommendations contained in a
simultaneously released report on
the government securities market
prepared by the Treasury Depart-

ANNOUNCEMENT

Conference on
Food Labeling
Guidelines
The Food Processors Institute, the education and
training branch of the National Food Processors Association, will be hosting a
conference November
16-18 on how to comply
with the new federal requirements for food labeling. At the conference, expert speakers will clarify the
final rules promulgated by
the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture.
For more information,
contact Rita Bahner, executive director of the Food
Processors Institute. (202639-5900).

ment, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The proposed changes include a
new "single price" pricing process
designed to discourage collusion
and permission for individual investors to participate in auctions.
In addition, more firms would be
encouraged to apply for primary
dealer status under new eligibility
requirements.

FDA Showing Concern
Over Promotion of
Prescription Drugs
Recently, the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") has indicated that it will scrutinize promotional schemes for prescription
drugs much more closely than it
has in the past. In addition to
approving the sale and distribution
of drugs, the FDA has regulated
drug advertising since 1962. Since
then, industry advertising has
grown more diverse, and the FDA
is moving to control drug marketing in several arenas, including
promotion of prescription drugs to
consumers.
The FDA and Congress are both
looking at one particular technique
used to promote prescription drugs
to consumers, the video news release ("VNR"). VNRs are "news"
segments which drug companies
produce and provide to local television stations free of charge. Drug
companies or their public relations
firms hire physicians to star in the
video segments and often provide
the television stations with scripted
lead-ins to be used by newscasters.
In some cases, the VNRs contain blank audio and visual portions into which a local station may
tape its newscaster asking scripted
questions. Viewers are lead to believe they are watching an interview even though no conversation
has actually taken place.
The Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee, chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy, began
investigating VNRs last year. Eugene Secunda, assistant professor of
marketing at Baruch College in
New York City, testified that VNRs
"'are meant to deceive in the sense
that they do not represent them(continued on page 70)
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Recent Cases
Tenth Circuit Holds That
Statute Regulating
Alcohol Content
Advertising Does Not
Necessarily Violate The
First Amendment
In Adolph Coors Company v.
Brady , 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir.
1991), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that alcohol advertising and labeling are commercial speech protected under the First Amendment
and, when restrained, require a
balancing between the interests of
the public and the government.
Facts
In 1987, Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") requested approval
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("Bureau")
for labels and advertisements that
would disclose the alcohol content
of Coors and Coors Light beer. The
Bureau denied Coors's request because the Federal Alcohol Administration Act ("the Act"), 27 U.S.C.
205(e)(2) and (f)(2), prohibits labels or advertisements that disclose the alcohol content of malt
beverages unless otherwise authorized by state law.
District Court's Opinion
Coors sued the Bureau and the
United States Treasury in the
United States District Court for
the District of Colorado. Coors
claimed the Act violated its rights
under the free speech clause of the
First Amendment because the Act
prohibited Coors from disclosing
truthful information regarding the
alcohol content of its products.
Coors requested that the district
court overturn the Bureau's disclosure denial and declare 205(e)(2)
and (f)(2) of the Act unconstitutional.
The Treasury admitted that
these sections were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Consequently, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the
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United States House of Representatives ("the House") intervened
in the action to defend the constitutionality of the Act.
The district court concluded
that the sections constituted an
illegal restraint on commercial
speech under the First Amendment. In addition, the district
court found 205(e)(2) and (f)(2) of
the Act unconstitutional and
barred the Bureau from enforcing
the sections. The Treasury and the
House appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.
Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling because it
found a factual dispute existed as
to the issues. In its determination
of constitutionality, the appellate
court used a four-part test outlined
by the United States Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Serv. Comm'n. , 447 U.S.
557 (1980). This test applies to
regulations that limit commercial
speech and which allegedly violate
the First Amendment. The Central

ANNOUNCEMENT
Consumers Satisfied
with Air Bags
Consumers appear to be relatively satisfied with air bags according to two time-honored tests.
People are not suing over air bags,
and they are not complaining
about them either.
The big three American automobile manufacturers currently have
sold more than 6 million cars with
air bags. They are defendants in
only about 60 lawsuits over air
bags, only one of which concerns a
fatality.
Furthermore, of 200,000 alleged
safety defects reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's safety hotline, only
370 complaints concerned air bags.
Finally, since 1987, there have
been recalls of only 10,543 air bags
compared to 4.7 million seat belts.
All of these statistics indicate a
spectacular track record of reliability of air bags.

Hudson test states that a statute is
constitutional if: (1) the expression
being regulated is protected by the
First Amendment; (2) the government interest in the regulation is
substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances this interest; and
(4) the regulation is not overly
restrictive.
First, the appellate court noted
that the Supreme Court has recognized advertising and product labeling as commercial speech. Under the first part of the Central
Hudson test, this speech is protected under the First Amendment if it
involves lawful activity and is not
misleading. The appellate court
stated that, because the proposed
advertising and labeling involved a
legal activity under federal law and
was not misleading, it was protected under the First Amendment.
The second part of the test requires that the government's interest in regulating the disclosure of
alcohol content in advertising and
product labeling is substantial. The
appellate court determined that
the government had a substantial
and legitimate interest in the regulation because it prevented unfair
competition and protected the consumer.
In finding a substantial government interest, the court accepted
the government's argument that a
prohibition on the disclosure of the
alcohol content would prevent
"strength wars" in the brewing
industry. In other words, the statute alleviated pressure on brewers
to produce beer on the basis of an
increased alcohol content. Additionally, the appellate court found
Coors's admission that it wanted
to display the alcohol content of its
product to overcome the product's
image of being a weak beer illustrative of this concern. Thus, the
court maintained that a restriction
on disclosure would result in the
production of lower alcohol content beers, thereby protecting both
the industry and the consumer.
Next, the appellate court determined that the district court had
not addressed the question of
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